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1. The facts in this Keynote Address are derived from the personal memories
and experiences gained by Dean Claudio Grossman before, during, and after the
AMIA attack. All of the details regarding the AMIA investigation may be found in
the following source, which provides the relevant citations to the trial record.
Claudio Grossman, Informe de decano Claudio Grossman Observador
Internacional de la Comision Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el Juicio
de la AMIA (Feb. 22, 2005), https://www2.jus.gov.ar/amia/grossman.htm.
* Professor Claudio Grossman served as Dean of American University,
Washington College of Law for 20 years. He is presently a member of the United
Nations International Law Commission, a key body for the development of
international law. He is also on the board of the Open Societies Foundations Justice
Initiative and the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Human Rights, and is the President
of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights. He previously served as the
Chairperson of the United Nations Committee Against Torture, one of the UN's
human rights treaty-monitoring bodies. Most recently, Dean Grossman served as
the agent of Chile in a case between Chile and Bolivia before the International
Court of Justice. In the past, he also served on the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, serving two terms as the Commission's president. While serving as
President of the Commission, he was appointed to be its observer at the AMIA
bombing trial.
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I. INTRODUCTION
2018 marked the 25th anniversary of the AMIA bombing. It is
a sad anniversary. Memoria Activa presented the case to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in 1999, and now, 25
years later, its perpetrators remain at large. What mattered then,
and now, is bringing those responsible to justice.
II. THE DECISION TO OBSERVE THE TRIAL AND THE SCOPE OF THE
OBSERVATION
Initially, when Memoria Activa brought the case to the
Commission, there was a discussion in the Commission regarding
the appointment of an observer. The Commission had observed
situations in the past, investigating and issuing reports establishing
the responsibility of States. Because of the mass and gross
violations of human rights committed by dictatorial regimes in the
Americas, the Commission had resorted to country reports as a
preferred mechanism to expose the magnitude and character of
those violations. On occasion, the Commission's reports were
preceded by an observation in loco. In other occasions, such as in
the absence of an authorization to enter a country, reports were
preceded by extensive interviews and research done with victims,
international civil servants, NGO's, and the public in general.
The AMIA observation was different because it would not
lead to a report on the overall human rights situation in Argentina;
instead, the Commission would be restricted to observing a case. I
had acted before as an observer for the Commission in other
situations with the aim of investigating a single event and drawing
conclusions based on the facts available. For instance, I was
appointed to be an observer following the "Massacre of Navidad"
in Bolivia, where the Bolivian police killed 11 miners after they
resisted the sale of a goldmine. Additionally, all of us in the
Commission had visited dozens of jails. But, observing a case is
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different. For instance, no conclusions are drawn or made public
during the observation and the observers do not control the
procedure. In spite of these differences, and the lack of specific
institutional precedents, we decided to observe this case because
of an important principle in human rights law - the principle that
the requests of victims should be honored as far as possible. In
classic international law, an ambiguous provision in a treaty is
interpreted in favor of state sovereignty. This is not the case in
human rights law. Here, when you have a doubt, treaties are
interpreted in favor of human beings, and in light of their object
and purpose. So, in August 2000, while I was President of the
Commission, I was appointed to serve as the observer for the case.
Both the petitioners and the Government agreed to my
appointment.
Once the decision was made to appoint an observer, the next
issue became determining the scope of the observation. According
to the initial position of the government of Argentina, the
observation should have been restricted solely to the trial. Instead,
I suggested that we look at the trial and everything relevant to the
terrorist attack against he AMIA. We did not want to narrow the
scope of our observation solely to the determination of whether the
trial was fair. If the analysis would have stopped there, the
Commission would not have been in the position to elaborate
further, including commenting on topics related to the broader
context of the case and on what transpired from it. It would not
have been able to make recommendations concerning follow-up
and so forth. To the credit of the Argentine government, it did not
object to our "counteroffer", and we leapt at the opportunity.
III. PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA
The Commission wanted to ensure that the observation
covered every matter that could be relevant to the success of its
mission. To achieve that goal, it was essential to have a permanent
presence in the country, so our observation would not be restricted
by the schedule of the trial. That required having a fulltime person
in the country during those three years, in addition to having me
attend as many sessions of the trial as possible. It also required
interviewing relevant actors, including victims, journalists,
government officials, NGO members, and academics. We also had
to examine records contained in 600 books, which were 200 pages
each, plus other editions that were more or less the same length.
20201
SOUTHWESTERAT JOURNVAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [
(While the Commission was not able to read all of them, we were
able to assess the professionalism and quality of the work). Since I
was the Dean of a law school at the time, and could not attend
some of the sessions, we hired an excellent individual, Maria
Lusto, to be there on the ground fulltime. I visited Argentina more
than twelve times during this period, sometimes for a week or
more, and used the phone, internet, and all means available to aid
the endeavor.
IV. REALITY AND APPEARANCE OF INDEPENDENCE
The Commission not only needed to act independently, but
also to appear independent and above any influence that would
interfere with it performing its mission to produce an "objective"
report. In accordance with the famous proverb, the wife of Caesar
not only needs to be, but also needs to appear to be, above any
suspicion. This meant, for example, that the Commission needed
to abstain from making any statement during the trial. This was
not easy because the case attracted both domestic and international
attention, and there were numerous requests for interviews and
comments. It was very important to understand, however, that the
success of the mission depended on its objectivity. This required
overseeing the whole trial without prejudging any outcome until
the end of the mission, while supporting those internal actors
involved in the case with our presence and conduct. The judges
needed the additional political space created by the observation of
the Commission to make their decisions and to satisfy their duty to
uphold the high standards for judicial independence established by
the American Convention.
We came to the conclusion that the three judges of the tribunal
in charge of the trial, Guillermo Andrejo Gordo, Gerardo Felipe
Larrambere, and Miguel Nigel Pons, performed their functions
with professionalism and integrity and exemplified what it meant
to be competent judges. They were not influenced politically, and
they took the role of the judiciary in determining the truth very
seriously. As the world was watching Buenos Aires through our
eyes, the presence in situ of the Commission gave them additional
support.
These judges deserved recognition because they dismantled a
conspiracy that came from the highest echelons of the political
establishment in Argentina. Had it not been for them, the
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policemen who were accused would likely have been indicted, and
the cover-up would have been successful.
V. THE TRIAL
Concerning the trial itself, let me start with the compelling
testimony of some witnesses. I will never forget the testimony of
two female witnesses, one of whom also survived the Second
World War. The first woman was walking her little dog in front of
the AMIA right before the explosion. She knelt down to pick up
her dog as the AMIA exploded, and this act saved her life. The
second woman was taking her young son to the doctor, but she
stopped to look in a store along the way. As a result, she and her
son were in front of the AMIA when the terrorist attack took
place. Her son died as a result of the explosion, and she blamed
herself for deciding to stop at the store. The experiences of these
women illustrate the fleeting nature of existence and how lives can
be arbitrarily lost. As these testimonies took place in the beginning
of the trial, they were grim reminders of the multiple impacts and
dimensions of the tragedy caused by the attack.
A. Failure to Prevent
Very early on, we recognized issues with the investigation,
including the failure of the Argentinian State to prevent the
bombing. Among other indications, we learned in the trial that
there were warnings in cables from the Argentinian embassies in
Lebanon and Israel mentioning that an attack would take place,
but the State did not adequately respond to these warnings.
Additionally, there were two policemen in a parked car in front of
the AMIA, but the car's engine was not working. One of the
policemen was not even in position - he was drinking coffee
somewhere else. There were multiple indications of an absolute
failure to take appropriate measures of prevention, compounded
by the fact that two years earlier, a terrorist attack against the
embassy of Israel in Argentina had killed 30 people and wounded
over 80.
B. Irregularities in the Investigation
Irregularities in the investigation were also apparent early on
and continued to develop throughout our observation. First, there
20201
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were reports of a mysterious helicopter that appeared the night
before the attack. Numerous witnesses aw the helicopter over the
AMIA, but the prosecution did not look into these reports early on.
It was also known that a construction container in front of the
AMIA, which belonged to a businessman who imported the same
explosive that destroyed the AMIA, was removed shortly before
the attack. The owner's records showed that he could not account
for those explosives.
There were also serious issues with gathering evidence in a
timely manner. In my experience being on the Commission to
Control INTERPOL's Files for eight years, investigations need to
begin immediately, otherwise, evidence is lost. You need to do
everything possible to preserve evidence. In the trial, it was shown
that telephonic records were not requested until years later, which
only hindered proper investigation and gave time for the
perpetrators to hide additional evidence. For instance, there was a
record of a call by Kanoore Edul to Telleldin, the car thief who
sold the Renault Trafic van used in the attack. But, when he was
asked a couple years later what had happened and why he had
called the car thief, he said that it had been his driver. The driver,
however, responded that it was not him because he was
hospitalized at the time. Crimes of this nature are not committed in
the presence of a notary public. Rather, they are conspiracies
where those involved try to erase all evidence of their
participation. An effective prosecution acts promptly, investigating
all possible routes and moving with determination and speed. To
the contrary, the delays, inefficiencies, and lack of commitment in
the AMIA prosecution make it a poster child for how a
prosecution should not take place.
C. Questioning Witnesses and Suspects
There were also serious and unacceptable issues when it came
to questioning witnesses and suspects. For instance, the authorities
allowed Mose Ravani, the cultural attache of the Iranian embassy,
to leave Argentina, even though the Intelligence service in
Argentina possessed a photo showing Ravani attempting to buy a
vehicle similar to the one used in the terrorist attack. While
absolute immunity exists for some diplomats, Ravani was not
entitled to such immunity. The authorities needed to question him,
but did not. There were many other examples of inexcusable
omissions, but we simply do not have time to cover them all. Let
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me mention just one that caught my attention. On the 4th of April
1994, an Iranian national attempted to leave the country through
the Argentinean international airport in Ezeiza using a North
American passport that was not his, which is extremely suspicious.
He was caught and placed at the disposition of the Argentinean
authorities. Then, on July 11 th, one week before the attack, he
requested authorization to leave the country and return to Iran; his
request was granted on July 2 5th, one week after the terrorist attack
- how is that possible?
D. The Finding of the Motor
Even considering the unacceptable actions by the authorities
mentioned above, perhaps the most suspicious behavior is related
to the handling of the vehicle motor after the attack. The signed
affidavits of two witnesses show that the motor was discovered
almost immediately after the bombing. However, in the oral trial,
the witnesses testified that they did not discover the motor and that
they were ordered to sign the affidavits. Only later in the trial did
it become apparent that the people who discovered the motor were
part of an Israeli group sent to assist in the investigation.
Experienced in investigations, they photographed the motor and
provided credible evidence of the date and location of their
discovery. The mystery is that it seems that the Israelis discovered
the motor after the police had gone to pick up Telleldin, the car
thief who was responsible for selling the vehicle used in the
terrorist attack. If the motor was not discovered until after
Telleldin was detained, then why did the police seek him out? That
would have been enough to raise tremendous doubts about the
integrity of the investigation, but there is another very important
piece of evidence regarding Telleldin that erases any remaining
doubt.
E. Destruction of Evidence
When the Buenos Aires police went to Telleldin's house to try
to convince him to surrender, he was not there because he had
escaped to a town near Paraguay. The officers then phoned
Telleldin to convince him to come back and surrender. Sixty-six
tapes of those conversations were made, and those tapes, which
were crucial, inter alia, to analyze his motives and the reasons for
his surrender, mysteriously disappeared. We have no idea what
20201
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Telleldin said. The destruction of evidence is always a serious
matter.
However, there were still other issues, especially concerning
the behavior of judge Galeano. A missing video showed Galeano
and an assistant offering $400,000 to Telleldin to implicate the
police of a precinct in Buenos Aires as the authors of the terrorist
attack. When the policemen were indicted, their lawyer went to
Galeano and asked to meet with him alone to show him a copy of
the video - in spite of early confessions by Telleldin implicating
three middle eastern individuals and then a central American.
Following the meeting, the video went missing and the Judge
ordered the detention of the lawyer, who was jailed for 40 days. A
commission of Congress supported the Judge's decision, and the
executive did as well. They claimed this was all a conspiracy to
blackmail the Judge and that the video was not available because it
had been stolen.
F. Parallel Investigations and the Absence of a Credible Narrative
Judge Galeano also opened "parallel investigations" to
undermine the original purpose of his appointment to identify and
prosecute those guilty of committing the terrorist attack. These
detours appeared to be solely designed to avoid disclosing
information and to consume resources that would have been better
used going after credible evidence. The indictment of the police
officers, as shown by the video where judge Galeano bribed
Telleldin to change its testimony, would be enough to show the
questionable behavior of Judge Galeano. Additionally, during the
first two years that followed the attack, there was no evidence
concerning the involvement of the indicted policemen. Later,
based on Telleldin's testimony and the testimony of a witness with
strong connections to the security services in Argentina who was
given access to Telleldin under the false pretext of been his
relative, it was alleged that the police had blackmailed Telleldin in
the past regarding his "business" of stealing cars. These
circumstances gave support o the opinion that the indictment of
the policemen was a way to uphold an appearance of investigating
the attack without going after the States that appeared directly
involved in the attack, namely Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran.
It was never probed or argued why Hezbollah would risk
asking corrupt policemen in Buenos Aires to be directly involved
in the terrorist attack. Little or no research was done on a
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persuasive motive behind this "internal connection". The police
were obviously corrupt, but at the same time, it appeared that the
authorities decided not o confront Iran, Syria, or Lebanon. Was it
a political calculation based on an analysis of the position of
Argentina and its interests in the world, and specifically in those
countries? Were the authorities concerned about further terrorist
attacks following the two that had already taken place? Why did it
take Argentina more than two years to request that INTERPOL
issue red notices for the detention of the Iranian nationals
allegedly involved in the attack? Why did the investigation fail to
look seriously into the involvement of Syria?
VI. CONCLUSION
To the credit of Argentina and the judges in the trial, a "punto
final" was not placed in the case, and a cover up was exposed. The
President of Argentina at the time also fully accepted our report.
However, our recommendations concerning a thorough
investigation and legal changes concerning, inter alia, changes in
the laws that regulate security matters, have not been
implemented. The world received with horror the news of the
killing of Alberto Nisman, the prosecutor appointed after Galeano,
and criticized an attempted "agreement" with Iran, which would
not have ensured justice in the case.
Allow me to finish my remarks by resorting to literature,
which, as Milan Kundera says, shows with imagination the hidden
aspects of reality. In the book, La Fiesta del Chivo by Mario
Vargas Llosa, an individual, who lost the the favor of dictator
Trujillo, attempted to regain that favor by giving his daughter to
Trujillo to be raped. Notwithstanding the repulsiveness of the act,
what was interesting to me was that the act appeared to be
completely normal, or otherwise an entirely rational course of
action. Surrendering his daughter is what he needed to do, so he
did it. One cannot but notice that one of the worst consequences of
dictatorship, and perhaps other forms of authoritarianism, is that a
distortion of common sense occurs, and abhorrent and insane
behavior becomes normal. Conspiracies, cover ups, and even
assassinations have pervaded our observation of this case. From
this perspective, the AMIA case is not just about the AMIA. It is
about the possibility to strengthen and rebuild institutions so that
such abhorrent behavior is not seen as a normal event. This will
not be possible, however, until justice is served, the suspects of
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this terrorist attack are tried, and full reparation is made to include
truth, satisfaction, and measures of non-repetition.
